The durability paradox: whose product, whose rules?
A consumer purchases a machine, yet its useful life may depend on decisions made long after the transaction: whether the manufacturer stocks a replacement component, releases a software update or permits an independent technician to run a diagnostic tool. Ownership, in other words, need not confer meaningful control over maintenance. Right-to-repair campaigns exploit that tension, but the legal and economic questions it raises resist the tidy opposition of virtuous fixers and cynical corporations.
The familiar claim that products were once 'built to last' combines a genuine concern with a selection effect. Durable examples remain in households and museums; failed equivalents are less visible. Modern engineering has also delivered safer appliances, lower energy consumption and compact devices whose construction may be inherently more complex. None of this absolves manufacturers of deliberate anti-repair design. It does, however, make a broken product an inadequate substitute for evidence of planned obsolescence. The relevant tests are intentionality, feasible alternatives, documented restrictions and the consequences for consumers.
At least three mechanisms warrant separation. Technical obsolescence occurs when components fail or software support ceases; it may be preventable or unavoidable. Economic obsolescence arises when repair costs exceed replacement costs, even though a product remains physically repairable. Perceived obsolescence is driven by taste, fashion or status: a perfectly functioning device is displaced by something newer. Fast fashion exemplifies the latter, although garment quality, supply-chain practices and disposal introduce additional material harms. Treating all three as identical encourages sweeping remedies that may miss their target.
The EU's 2026 measures offer a more incremental policy experiment. From 31 July, the directive promoting repair has applied through national law, requiring manufacturers to offer repair for specified products covered by existing EU reparability requirements, within a reasonable period and at a reasonable price unless free. A qualifying consumer choice of repair rather than replacement during the seller's liability period brings at least a twelve-month extension. Separately, consumer-law changes applicable from 27 September target misleading durability claims and certain premature-obsolescence practices. Product-specific requirements for newer smartphones and tablets include repairability information, parts availability and extended software support. These instruments overlap in purpose but differ markedly in scope and enforcement.
A manufacturer may invoke safety, cybersecurity, intellectual property or warranty integrity to defend controlled access. Some concerns are legitimate: a poorly installed battery can be hazardous, and unrestricted software changes can compromise a connected device. Yet proprietary control can also exclude independent repairers, create captive aftermarket demand and increase the cost of ownership. A defensible regime must distinguish necessary safeguards from restrictions whose commercial convenience is presented as a technical necessity.
Distributional effects complicate the apparent win-win. Requiring every small producer to maintain expensive inventories and documentation for years may entrench well-capitalised incumbents. Conversely, allowing large brands to monopolise tools and parts can strangle local repair businesses. A longer-lasting product may command a higher upfront price, placing it beyond the reach of consumers who would benefit most from its lower lifetime cost. Repair incentives might create skilled jobs and reduce material extraction; badly designed subsidies could merely reimburse people who would have repaired anyway.
The environmental calculus likewise needs a counterfactual. Extending a product's life avoids some manufacturing impacts, but an exceptionally inefficient appliance can consume enough extra energy to change the balance. Repair activity uses parts, transport and labour, while rapid replacement produces further waste. A credible lifecycle comparison specifies the alternatives, expected remaining years, usage intensity, energy mix and realistic repair outcomes. 'Repair is always greener' is no more analytically robust than 'newer is always better'.
A subtler barrier is the erosion—or uneven distribution—of practical competence. Traditional US Home Economics and Shop courses taught some students domestic and mechanical skills, though access and gender assumptions varied. Their contemporary descendants have not vanished uniformly, and Spain's technology subjects and vocational pathways are not direct equivalents. Restoring practical education may foster autonomy, but schools cannot be expected to compensate indefinitely for products designed to resist maintenance. Nor should unpaid household repair labour be romanticised when specialist work deserves fair remuneration.
Legislators therefore face a design problem rather than a moral referendum. Which product categories justify mandatory part availability? For how long, and at what maximum price? What can safely be withheld? Should small manufacturers receive phased obligations, or would exemptions undermine competition? How should regulators audit durability claims, test actual repair outcomes and revise ineffective rules? The strongest framework may prove neither universally permissive nor uniformly stringent. It would make the costs, rights and exceptions explicit—and remain open to evidence that its own incentives have gone awry.
